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COMMENT
ISSUES OF LIABILITY SURROUNDING FIRE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE AREA
During the summer of 1988, national attention was centered on the
great conflagration in Yellowstone National Park (YNP).1 Based upon
misleading news reporting, most of the nation mistakenly believed that
our first National Park had been destroyed. 2 These fires had actually
burned, to some extent, on a total area of 1.4 million acres in the Greater
Yellowstone Area (GYA). The GYA encompasses 11.7 million acres of
land in northwest Wyoming, southwest Montana and eastern Idaho.
Many different fires were part of the total conflagration. The fires burned
in YNP and on surrounding private and state owned lands within the
GYA.3 Of this total acreage, approximately 400,000 acres outside YNP's
boundaries were touched by the fires." Most of the communities along the
Park's borders were either threatened or damaged by the fires.5 Fire is
viewed by most as a natural and productive occurrence for the wilderness
areas in and around the Park.' However, the effects of fire on the developed areas bordering the Park are not usually considered beneficial by
those who live and work in the surrounding area.
The GYA consists mainly of federally owned land controlled by the
National Park Service (NPS) or the United States Forest Service
(USFS). 7 The communities within the GYA are Cody, Jackson and Dubois, Wyoming and West Yellowstone, Silver Gate, Cooke City, Red
Lodge and Gardiner, Montana. One major private land holder bordering
the Park is the Church Universal and Triumphant (CUT), which owns a
large ranch near Gardiner, Montana. During the 1988 fire season, several
of these communities and the CUT ranch were threatened and damaged
by the fires.'
The types of damages suffered as a result of the fires varied significantly. The fires caused damage to federal timber, grasslands, ranges and
facilities within YNP and surrounding federal property.9 The United
1. Chris Elfring, Yellowstone: Fire Storm over Fire Management, BIOSCIENCE Vol.
39 No. 10, November 1989, at 670-71.
2. Id. at 671.
3. GREATER YELLOWSTONE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE

POSTFIRE ASSESSMENT (1989) [hereinafter Assessment], at 2.
4. ROBERT EKEY, YELLOWSTONE ON FIRE 12 (1989).

5. Id. at 11.
6. Assessment, supra note 3, at 3. A burned forest is simply a forest in a different
cycle of its existence. It is a cleansing of old and the birth of the new. The lodgepole

pine, the most common tree in the GYA, actually needs fire to spread its seeds.
7. Paul Schullery, The Fires and Fire Policy, BIOSCIENCE, Vol. 39 No. 10, November 1989, at 686.
8. EKEY, supra note 4, at 21-28.
9. Assessment, supra note 3, at viii-ix.
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States also spent $120 million solely on suppression efforts. "1 The local
communities suffered from poor air quality, forced evacuation, some destruction of private property, and a decline in local tourism which led to
lost revenues for the local businesses."
The fires of 1988 also stirred a heated debate concerning the proper
fire management policy for YNP. Following the 1988 experience and the
subsequent controversy, the United States Department of the Interior
(USDI) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) appointed a team of experts to assess the fires and to examine the YNP fire
management plan. Following its investigation, the team reaffirmed that
fire plays an important role in the management of public lands."2 However, the team also made several recommendations to the USDI and
USDA which would strengthen the fire management plan by creating better control of fires.'2 The team's efforts have resulted in a proposed Yellowstone National Park Wildland Fire Management Plan (hereinafter,
new plan).
The new plan recognizes the ecological role of fire and would continue to permit certain fires to burn. Therefore, the risk of damage and
injury still exists. In fact, the severity of the 1988 fires in Yellowstone is
considered by some experts to be a normal periodic occurrence," although fires the magnitude of 1988 are believed to occur only every 200300 years." Thus, given particular environmental conditions and the limited suppression efforts permitted by the new plan, the potential for damaging fire in the GYA still exists."6
This comment uses the 1988 fire season in the GYA and the new plan
to analyze potential liability and remedies for damage caused by forest
fires. The analysis will first focus on what legal theories are available to
the federal government for recovery of damages caused to federal property by fires started by or the fault of non-federal parties. This discussion
will then consider the remedies available to private parties or non-federal

10. EKEY, supra note 4, at 15.

11. Assessment, supra note 3, at viii-ix. A total of 8.8% fewer people visited the
region during the summer of 1988. Private property damage was kept to a minimum

because protection of private property was a priority in the suppression efforts. See
Ekey, supra note 4, at 28.
12. Recommendations of the Fire Management Policy Review Team, 53 Fed. Reg.
51,196 (1988). [hereinafter Recommendations).
13. Id. The specific recommendations call for better inter-agency communication
and cooperation, clearer standards for determining when suppression is needed, and
straight forward understanding of the line of command.
14. Don G. Despain and William H. Romme, Historical Perspective on the Yellowstone Fires of 1988, BIOSCIENCE Vol. 39 No. 10, November 1989, at 695-699 [hereinafter Despain].
15. Id. at 698-99.
16.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, DRAFT WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT

PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 48-49 (1991) (Summary at 56 Fed. Reg. 36,831

(1991)) [hereinafter Management Plan]. The new plan calls for minimum impact tactics when suppressing fires. This includes very limited use of heavy equipment, such as
bulldozers. Many of the firefighters involved in the 1988 effort found the minimum
impact tactics to be a hindrance to their success. See also EKEY, supra note 4, at 95.
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entities for damages suffered due to fires which begin on federal land and
are a result of some federal action or inaction. It will be concluded that
neither side can easily obtain redress for forest fire damages, but that fire
damage should be greatly reduced due to the new plan's more aggressive
stance on suppression.
BACKGROUND

Throughout YNP's first 100 years, fire was viewed as a destructive force and was met with full suppression efforts. 17 However, a 1963
report by A. Starker Leopold was influencial in ending the era of full
suppression. Leopold and several other ecologists were enlisted by the
Secretary of the Interior to investigate wildlife management issues in
our National Parks.' 8 Leopold's report concluded that fire plays a role
in shaping the biological diversity of YNP, and that fire could improve the health and diversity of YNP and its inhabitants. 19 Therefore, in 1972 the NPS instituted a natural fire management plan
which allowed fires to burn in certain areas of the Park.
From 1972 to 1987, 235 fires were permitted to burn and all of
these fires were extinguished naturally.2 Very few of these fires grew
larger than 40 acres or caused extensive damage.2 Based upon this
record, the first 16 years of the YNP natural fire policy was generally
considered a success. This management plan remained in effect until
the the 1988 fires.22
The basic approach of the 1972 plan was the prescribed fire system. This system allowed naturally ignited fires to burn under previously designated environmental conditions, called prescriptions.22
Every fire was monitored from the time it was discovered. When a fire
burned beyond its prescriptions (acceptable pre-determined environmental conditions and boundaries), it was classified as a wildfire and
subject to full suppression." When generating a prescribed natural
fire plan the agency considered: the management objectives of the
area, the history of fire occurrence in the area, the natural role of fire
in the area, the expected fire behavior, the acceptable fire suppression
techniques, the adequate buffer zones, smoke management, and any
effects on adjacent land owners.2" This system of fire management was
17. Elfring, supra note 1, at 667.
18. Schullery, supra note 7, at 686.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 687-88.
21. Id. at 688.
22. Management Plan, supra note 17, at 8.
23. Chris Bolgiano, Yellowstone and the Let-Burn Policy, AMERICAN FORESTS
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 23.
24. Schullery, supra note 7, at 687. A wildfire is simply a fire which has either
burned beyond its "prescriptions" or is unwanted, which must be immediately
suppressed.
25. Recommendations, supra note 12, at 51,199. Each "prescribed fire" had to be
conducted under two conditions, (1) by qualified personnel who had precise written
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used during the 1988 fire season in the GYA.
Proposed Yellowstone National Park Wildland Fire Management
Plan
During the summers of 1989 and 1990, the NPS suppressed all
fires in the GYA pending the issuance of a new management plan. In
June of 1991, the USDI published its proposed plan for fire management in YNP. Under the new plan, the basic objectives of fire management in YNP remain unaltered.2 The objectives of the new management plan are to: "protect human life and property," suppress
wildfires economically and environmentally, "allow fire to play its ecological role in the park" as much as possible, maintain a fully qualified
fire management staff, and "maintain an effective system of informing
the public of the ecological benefits of fire to YNP. ''2 7 Thus, the new
plan emphasizes the same policy of prescribed fires, while also
stressing better management and tighter controls to protect against a
repeat of 1988.
The new plan includes three basic strategies. First, a Suppression
strategy is employed for all wildfires, which are defined as free burning and unwanted fires or fires which have burned beyond their prescriptions. Second, a Management-Ignited Prescribed Fires strategy
provides that fires may be intentionally ignited as a management tool
to reduce fuel accumulations around developed areas and communities near the Park boundaries.28 During the period in which a prescribed fire is permitted to burn the NPS continuously monitors the
fire. If these management ignited prescribed fires exceed their prescriptions, then they will be declared wildfires and subject to full suppression. Third, a Prescribed Natural Fire strategy identifies those
lightning caused fires which will be allowed to burn within certain
pre-determined prescriptions.
Pre-determined prescriptions are set according to three environmental conditions, the burning index, the energy release component,
and the drought index. 2 9 A prescribed fire, whether natural or man"prescriptions", and (2) each fire was monitored to assure they remained within their
"prescriptions." Id.
26. Final Report and Recommendations of the Fire Management Review Team
and Summary of Public Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,660 (1989) [hereinafter Final
Recommendations].
27. Management Plan, supra note 16, at 12.
28. Id. at 13. Fuels are defined as, "vegetative material that is capable of sustaining fire, such as grass, duff, needles, leaves, logs, shrubs, brush, snags, and trees."
Id. at 64.
29. Id. at 55. These three elements, burning index, energy release component, and
drought index are all measures which indicate the potential for fire in the forest. Each
one of these indices must be below a certain level to permit a prescribed fire to burn.
The levels are different for the two different zones where prescribed fires are allowed.
Also considered when determining whether to allow a fire to burn is the availabilty of
adequate fire management personnel and equipment. Id. at 53.
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agement ignited, will be permitted to burn if certain environmental
conditions are all within a certain pre-set level. However, once a fire
escapes the zonal boundaries or the burning conditions exceed the acceptable levels the fire will be classified as a suppressible wildfire. 0
Prescribed natural fires will be continually monitored by qualified
personnel from ignition until they are extinguished.3'
The limits of each prescribed natural fire must be developed by
the fire management officer in YNP.32 This officer is responsible for
writing prescribed burn plans and carrying out approved prescribed
burns.3 Prescribed fire plans must then be approved by the superintendent and the fire management committee of YNP. However, the
superintendent of YNP has final authority over all fire management
decisions in YNP under the new plan. 34 The new plan also divides the
park lands into three different zones according to which strategy will
be used. First, there is the suppression zone where all fires will be
immediately suppressed. The lands in this zone are developed areas
outside YNP, and a buffer zone just inside the park boundaries. Second, is the conditional zone where some prescribed natural fires will
be permitted to burn within limited prescriptions. The prescribed natural fires in this area have more conservative prescriptions than those
set in the prescribed natural fire zone. The lands included in the conditional zone are the areas 1.5 miles inside the park boundary and
some backcountry campgrounds and cabins. Third is the prescribed
natural fire zone where naturally started and management started
fires will be allowed to burn to their pre-determined prescriptions.
However, all non-management man-made fires in any zone will be declared wildfires and subject to immediate suppression."
The foregoing has been a cursory look at the new plan, which includes additional detailed guidelines beyond the scope of this comment. The new plan delegates management responsibilities, discusses
interagency coordination, creates a fire prevention program, and sets
out many other important guidelines.3 6 Because the new plan continues to use fire as a management tool, the potential for damage and
liability still exists. There remains a risk of a controlled fire growing
beyond its prescriptions and damaging persons or property and causing subsequent losses to the local economy.37 Although the new plan
30. Id. at 12-13.

31. Id. at 54. The NPS has set a certain level of qualification needed for this task.
32. Id. at 32-33.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 36, 39.
35. Id. at 13-15.
36. Id. at 30-50. For example, particular NPS employees are given specific responsibilities throughout the fire season, particularized training is required for those involved in the process, and specific decisions must be made according to given conditions. Such conditions are, moisture level, amount of available fuels, the potential for
lightning activity, and available suppression resources. Id.
37. JOSEPH L. SAX, Ecosystems and Property Rights in Greater Yellowstone: The
Legal System in Transition, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE EcOSYSTEM 79 (Robert B.
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sets stronger standards for fire managers to follow, any neglect creates
a potential for liability.
DISCUSSION

Actions and Remedies Available to the Federal Government s8
In analyzing this issue it is helpful to use the North Fork fire of
1988 as an example. The North Fork Fire of 1988 was started outside
the boundaries of YNP in Targhee National Forest by four private
citizens who were cutting wood. This fire was one of several large fires
which burned in the GYA in 1988. It affected approximately 490,200
acres.3 9 It is unlikely that a fire approaching this magnitude will occur
in the GYA anytime in the near future because, historically, similarly
sized fires occur only every 200-300 years. 0 However, the risk of fire
spreading to unwanted areas is inherent in any wildland fire management plan because of the dangerous nature of fire.4 Therefore, even
under the new plan there is still potential for unnaturally and naturally ignited fires to cause significant damage to resources inside and
outside the park.
Federal Statutory Relief
Federal law provides limited relief to the federal government for
injury caused by fires started by non-federal entities. Two federal
criminal statutes impose sanctions for this type of fire.4" The first one
provides, "whoever, willfully and without authority, sets on fire any
timber, underbrush or grass. . . upon the public domain. . . shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years or
both. ' ' '3 This statute appears to apply only when the fire is actually
started on federal domain and not when the fire spreads from private
property. However, in United States v. Alford the United States Supreme Court interpreted the statute to apply to fires built near federal
land as well as those fires ignited on federal land." Therefore, a nonfederal party might violate this statute if he or she built a fire upon
Keiter and Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991).
38. Norman J. Wiener, Uncle Sam and Forest Fires:His Rights and Responsibilities, 15 ENVTL. L. 623 (1985). This YNP fire management comment is organized into
sections which are similar to Mr. Wiener's excellent essay.
39. Assessment, supra note 3, at 105. The North Fork fire burned mainly in the
northwest quadrant of YNP and affected the towns of West Yellowstone and Gardiner,
Montana.
40. Despain, supra note 14, at 695-99.
41. Final Recommendations, supra note 26, at 25,660.
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1855, 1856 (1988).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1855 (1988).
44. 274 U.S. 264 (1927). The defendant had built a fire on private land but near
inflammable grass which was on the public domain. The defendant's demurrer was
sustained below but the United States Supreme Court reversed the demurrer because
the statute applied to the defendant's activity. Id. at 266.
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his or her own property and subsequently the fire spread to federal
land.
A finding of guilt under this statute permits a fine of up to
$250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. 45 Clearly the
limits set on these fines would prevent the government from recovering all of its losses from a large fire. The North Fork fire suppression
costs alone were $25,000,000. " Additionally, it is unlikely that an individual will have access to funds sufficient to pay the maximum fine. If
recoverable these fines might cover the costs for smaller fires which
cause less damage and are more easily contained.
The second applicable federal criminal statute sets a maximum
7
fine of $500 and a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment.
It provides,
Whoever, having kindled or caused to be kindled, a fire in or near
any forest or timber, or other inflammable material upon any
lands owned, controlled or leased by . . . the United States, leaves
said fire without totally extinguishing the same, or permits or suffers said fire to burn or spread beyond his control, or leaves . . .
said fire to burn unattended, shall be fined not more
than $500 or
48
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
This statute exists as punishment to the perpetrator, but with a maximum fine of $500 it is obviously not intended as a remedy for federal
losses.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Launder,49 interpreted this statute to include an element of criminal intent.
The defendant built a signal fire when he became lost in the national
forest and left the fire unattended only after it got out of control. His
conviction under this statute was reversed because the prosecution
failed to prove the necessary criminal intent.50 The court stated that a
showing of a willful act or failure to act would be sufficient to prove
the required criminal intent."1
It is well established that federal criminal statutes designed to
prevent forest fires are constitutionally valid.52 The federal government's authority over the public domain is also broad enough to allow
regulation of conduct on adjacent non-federal land,"3 as long as the

45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)(3),(c)(3) (1988).
46. Ross W. SIMPSON, THE FIRES OF '88 26 (1989). Despite the massive suppression
effort, extinguishment of the North Fork fire did not occur until the fall snows.

47. 18 U.S.C. § 1856 (1988).

48. Id.
49. 743 F.2d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 690.
51. Id. at 689.
52. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927); United States v. Lindsey,
595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979).
53. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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regulation is reasonably necessary to protect federal property."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Lindsey,
reversed a dismissal of charges for violating a federal law that prohibited building fires without a permit. 56 The defendants were charged
with violating USDA regulations which require a permit to camp and
5
build fires on a portion of land surrounded by national forest. The
the
down
trip
a
raft
on
a
fire
while
built
and
camped
defendants had
Snake River in Idaho. All of the land surrounding the river campsite
was owned by the United States, but the area where the defendants
camped was state owned.5" Despite the fact that the river was owned
by Idaho, the statute was held to be applicable against the
defendants.6 8
The NPS has an additional statutory provision available for recovery of forest fire damage.59 The Park System Resource Protection
Act provides, "any person who destroys, causes the loss of, or injures
any park system resource is liable to the United States for response
costs and damages resulting from such destruction, loss, or injury."'60
This act defines both response costs and park system resource very
broadly. Response costs clearly include all suppression costs spent in
an effort to put out a fire, and park system resource includes any living or nonliving resource that is in the park system.6 1 A party will also
be liable for any injury to a park resource caused by an instrument
under the party's control.6 2 This statute provides affirmative defenses,
such as: an act of God, acting with due care, or that the activity which
caused the damage was authorized by law."
Clearly the NPS could have invoked this statute against the four
loggers responsible for the 1988 North Fork fire. Whether the loggers
would have been held liable is uncertain since the NPS opted not to
proceed against them. The loggers caused damage to park system resources by carelessly discarding lighted cigarettes in the dry forest
next to YNP. Had an action been brought against the loggers under
this statute, they would likely have argued that the wind was an act of
God which intervened and relieved them of liability. However, since
the Park System Resource Protection Act has not been construed in
the court system, the outcome would be speculative.
Federal statutory law provides limited relief to the federal gov54. Lindsey, 595 F.2d at 6.
55. Id. at 6.
56. 36 C.F.R. § 261.52(a) (1990) (prohibits using a campfire without a permit).
57. Lindsey, 595 F.2d at 6.
58. Id.
59. Park System Resource Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj to 19jj-4 (1991).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1.(a) (1991).
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj(c), (d) (1991). Some examples of resources in YNP are, timber, wildlife, geothermal pools and geysers, plant life, waters and NPS facilities.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1.(b) (1991).
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj-1.(c)(1), (2) ,(3) (1991).
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ernment for fires which are started by private individuals or organizations, whether started in YNP or outside it. The NPS, through the
Park System Resource Protection Act, has a clear avenue for recovery
when its resources are damaged due to another's negligence. However,
the USFS does not have this explicit remedy and the NPS's recovery
may be blocked by specifically enumerated defenses within the act. As
a result the federal government may have to look beyond the federal
statutes in an attempt to recover losses caused by forest fires in the
GYA.
State Statutory Relief
Both Montana and Idaho have statutes which authorize civil actions when property is damaged due to fire. 6" Wyoming however, does
not have a similar civil liability statute. Generally, when the federal
government opts to proceed under one of these state laws it wears the
same shoes as an injured landowner." Thus, like any injured party
suing for damages under a statute, the United States must prove all
the elements of the cause of action.
The Montana statute states that,
Any person who shall upon any land within this state ... set or
leave any fire that shall spread and damage or destroy property of
any kind not his own shall be liable for all damages caused
thereby, and any owner of property damaged or destroyed by
such fire may maintain a civil action for the purpose of recovering
such damages."
The Montana Supreme Court in Whitehawk v. Clark, read into
this statute an element of intent. 67 In Whitehawk, a private rancher's
son set fire to the rancher's land to clean irrigation ditches." The fire
spread onto neighboring private land and destroyed three buildings.
The injured adjacent landowners brought suit under this statute, alleging strict liability and negligence per se. The trial court refused to
instruct the jury that the statute was not limited to when there was
"intentional burning of excess forest material,"(emphasisadded) and
held for the defendants." The Montana Supreme Court reversed because the instruction should have been given. The Montana Supreme
Court stated that the statute is limited to those situations where there
has been an "intentionally" ignited fire, but the statute is not limited
to the burning of "excess forest materials."(emphasis added).70 The
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-63-103 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 38-107 (1988).

65. United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 547 F.2d 1101, 1104
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Boone, 476 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1973).
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-63-103 (1990).
67. 776 P.2d 484, 486 (Mont. 1989).
68. Id. at 484.
69. Id. at 485.

70. Id. at 487.
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court also held that a violation of this statute is negligence per se,
leaving the plaintiff to prove proximate cause, the amount of damages,
and to disprove any affirmative defenses."'
The construction of the Montana statute was also at issue in
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation v.
Clark Fork Logging, where a fire was accidently ignited by a chain
saw spark. 72 The Montana Supreme Court upheld a summary judgthe fire was not intentionally started
ment for the defendants because
73
by defendant's employees.
Given the facts surrounding the start of the 1988 North Fork fire,
this Montana statute probably would not have applied to the four loggers. They were careless in leaving their cigarettes, but likely did not
intentionally start the fire. The NPS would not get the benefit of negligence per se because it could not show violation of this statute and it
would alternatively have to prove all the elements of a common law
tort action.
The Idaho statute bases liability on a finding of willfulness or
negligence by the party who started the fire. 74 However, liability is
limited to the costs which the state or an authorized agency incur
while extinguishing the fire. The statute does not provide for recovery
of property damage. Therefore, if the NPS sought the actual damages,
it would have to plead further relief based on a different cause of action. The NPS would likely bring a common law tort action to recover
the actual damages to the resources or proceed under the Park System Resource Protection Act.
Assuming that the four loggers ignited the fire in Idaho instead of
Montana, and they were found to be negligent or to have acted willfully under the Idaho statute, the defendants could have been liable
for the entire cost of $25,000,000 for suppression. However, these four
defendants likely do not have the financial resources to satisfy a
judgement. If the loggers were employed by a large lumber company
and working in that capacity, the potential for full recovery would be
greater.
Wyoming does not provide a statutory cause of action similar to
Montana and Idaho. The Wyoming criminal code does include sanctions for negligently burning woods and failing to extinguish or contain fire in woods or on the prairie. 7' However, violations are misdemeanors, and therefore, the fine cannot exceed $750. Additionally, any
fine imposed under Wyoming law would go into the state treasury not
to the NPS. Thus, if a fire were to be started in Wyoming which then
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
finding

Id. A possible defense would be contributory negligence.
646 P.2d 1207 (Mont. 1982).
Id. at 1209.
IDAHO CODE § 38-107 (1988).
WYo. STAT. §§ 6-3-105, 106 (1977). "Criminal negligence" is required for a
of guilt under this statute and is defined at Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-104(a)(iii) (1977).
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burned into YNP, the NPS would have to rely on common law tort
actions or the Park System Resource Protection Act to recover either
costs or damages."
Common Law Remedies
Because the NPS likely will not be fully reimbursed for all the
costs and damages resulting from a fire begun by other parties under
federal or state statutory law, common law actions can be utilized as a
supplement. Potential common law theories are negligence, nuisance,
trespass and strict liability." Under these common law theories, the

defendant may be culpable if he or she acted negligently in starting
the fire or in failing to adequately control the fire.76
Negligence. Actions grounded in a common law theory of negligence for the unreasonable use of fire have a long history.79 Under the
common law, a party may be liable for damages from a fire's spread if
he or she did not act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances."' In United States v. Andrews, the court found the use of
an acetylene torch in a field of dry grass on an arid day to be unreasonable.8 ' The court held that the defendant should have been more
cautious. The court stated that the defendant should have cleared a
small area of the dry grass around the work area and
82 provided a readily available means to extinguish a potential fire.
An owner of property may also be held liable for not taking reasonable precautions to prevent the spread of a fire which passes
through or originates on his or her property.8 3 In Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. v. Aalco Wrecking Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was unreasonable not to employ a night watchman
at a building where the defendant had highly flammable materials
stored.8" During the early morning a fire began in a group of buildings
that the defendant had been demolishing. The fire then spread to the
plaintiff's property and caused extensive damage. The court held the
defendants liable for failing to protect against a known fire danger.88
The court suggested that the defendant would still be culpable if the
76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj to 19jj-4 (1988).
77. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 821D, 821E, 822, 158, 165

(1977) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENTS].

78. Martin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 474 P.2d 739 (Or. 1970); Chesapeake &
0. Ry. Co. v. United States, 139 F.2d 632, 633 (4th Cir. 1944).
79. Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837); see
generally R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 122-24
(4th ed. 1984).
80. United States v. Andrews, 206 F. Supp. 50, 51 (E.D. Idaho 1961).
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id.
83. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Aalco Wrecking Co., Inc., 466 F.2d. 179 (8th
Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
84. Id. at 183-84.
85. Id. at 183.
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fire originated elsewhere because the negligence was the failure to protect against a known fire danger and not for keeping flammable
materials on the premises.8 6 Therefore, when a fire starts without any
affirmative actions by a landowner, if the landowner knows of the fire,
he may still be found negligent for failing to take reasonable steps to
prevent the fire from spreading.
A common practice in negligence actions is to allege negligence
per se. In United States v. Burlington Northern,Inc., the federal government sued for fire suppression costs spent while fighting a fire
started by the defendant.8 7 The federal government claimed that
there was a showing of negligence per se because the defendant had
violated a Washington statute requiring the clearing of slash and debris from the defendant's logging operations.8 The United States failed
to request the proper instructions as to negligence per se at the trial
level. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the verdict for the defendant was affirmed.88
Had the negligence per se been properly argued and instructed, the
statutory violation might have resulted in negligence per se. This doctrine shifts the burden to the defendant to refute the presumption of
negligence. 0 Negligence per se does not alleviate the plaintiff's burden
of showing proximate cause.
Regulations exist which, if violated, might invoke negligence per
se in a common law action for recovery of fire damage. The NPS has
enacted regulations which govern the use of fire in the park system.9 1
These regulations prohibit using fire in non-designated areas, using
fire in a way that threatens park property or resources, leaving a fire
unattended, and throwing lighted material in a manner that threatens
or causes damage.' However, these regulations only apply to activities
within YNP. Therefore, the four loggers responsible for the 1988
North Fork fire, because they were outside of YNP, would not have
violated the regulations.
The federal government and all three states within the GYA have
forest protection statutes.9 3 These statutes increase the opportunity
for the government to argue negligence per se because of the number
of possible statutory violations. Each jurisdiction has established general regulatory provisions in order to protect the forests. For example,
Montana has made both the failure to extinguish a campfire and
86. Id.
87. 500 F.2d 637, 638 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. Id. at 638. "Slash" is the excess material that remains following a logging
operation.
89. Id. at 639.
90. Id. at 640. For example, an excuse might be that an emergency existed or the
violation occurred due to reasons beyond the defendant's control.
91. 36 C.F.R. § 2.13 (1990).
92. 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.13(a)(1), (3), (4), (5) (1990).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 554 (1988); WYo. STAT. §§ 35-9-101 to 304 (1977); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 76-13-101 to 601 (1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 38-101 to 138, 38-401 to 411 (1988).
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throwing a lighted cigarette on forest materials a misdemeanor." Investigation following the 1988 fires shows the four loggers were guilty
of throwing lighted cigarettes into forest materials. Showing a violation of one of these statutes can create negligence per se, which then
makes the burden of proving the negligence action easier.
Causation can be a difficult hurdle in a fire case because of the
nature of fire and weather. Experts in fire behavior were unable to
predict the behavior of fires forty-eight hours in advance during the
1988 fires.9 5 In Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & Western Lumber
Co., the defendant lawfully started a fire which was then spread by a
sudden unexpected and extraordinary wind.96 The Oregon Supreme
Court relieved the defendant of liability because the wind was an intervening cause.9 7 Other possible causation problems such as contributory negligence and comparative negligence could limit or preclude
recovery.
The federal government could have sued the four loggers who ignited the North Fork fire of 1988 based upon a common law negligence theory. The start of this fire occurred under similar conditions
as the fire in Andrews. The GYA suffered through an unprecedented
dry spell during the summer of 1988.98 The loggers dropped lit cigarettes into dry underbrush in the Targhee National Forest." These
actions would likely be found unreasonable under the circumstances,
as in Andrews.
Connecting the negligence of the loggers to the total amount of
damage resulting from the North Fork fire however, may be more difficult. Unusually high winds persisted throughout the GYA during
that summer.1"' August 20, 1988 was declared "black Saturday" because 150,000 additional acres burned in the entire GYA due to high
winds.10 ' These winds appear to have been sudden and unexpected,
creating an intervening cause, as in Silver Falls.
Trespass. A person is guilty of trespass if he or she intentionally
causes a thing to enter land in possession of another or fails to remove
from the land a thing which he or she is under a duty to remove.1"' A

94. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-13-123 to -124 (1990).
95. JOHN D. VARLEY AND PAUL SCHULLERY, Reality and Opportunity in the Yellowstone Fires of 1988, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM 112 (Robert B.
Keiter and Mark S. Boyce, eds., 1991) [hereinafter Varley]. Predicting fire behavior
weeks in advance is impossible for many of the same reasons why predicting weather is
so difficult. April and May of 1988 were extremely wet in the GYA. The National
Weather Service predicted normal precipitation for the area as late as July 1988, but
the precipitation never arrived. Id. at 111.
96. 40 P.2d 703, 713 (Or. 1935).
97. Id. at 713.
98. Elfring, supra note 1, at 667.
99. SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 24.
100. Elfring, supra note 1, at 667.
101. SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 27.
102. RESTATEMENTS, supra note 77, § 158.
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finding of trespass will follow if the act that caused a fire did, with
substantial certainty, cause the fire to enter the land.' 0 ' The comments to the Restatements (Second) of Torts give the example of a
dam being built which backs up water onto another's land. An uncontrolled fire started on adjacent land which spreads onto another's land
is analogous the water hypothetical given in the comments.
In Martin v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the spread of fire from the defendant's railroad right of way onto the plaintiffs rangeland, constituted trespass. '" The fire originated on the defendant's property and then was
negligently permitted to spread onto the plaintiffs land. The court
also reasoned that since the spread of the fire resulted from the defendant's negligent conduct, then that was sufficient to constitute
trespass.1"5 Therefore, trespass can arise when a landowner negligently
starts a fire and it then spreads onto another's land.
Use of trespass to recover fire damages is generally reserved to
those situations where a fire has spread from one owner's land to another's. Most of the land in the GYA is federally owned. Thus, the
occurrence of fires moving onto federal land from non-federal land is
unlikely because there is very little non-federal land from where fire
might spread. In fact, none of the fires of 1988 started on non-federal
land.'0 6 The federal government can argue and allege the trespass, but
it may not be necessary to the success of a suit brought by the federal
government to recover forest fire losses. Instead the federal government could rely on a negligence action and argue negligence per10 se
7
based upon any of the statutes potentially governing fire activity.
Nuisance. A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of his or her land.' 0 s
Only those parties who have property rights and privileges in the use
and enjoyment of the land affected may recover for a private nuisance.' 1 A party will be subject to liability for a private nuisance only
when his or her conduct is a legal cause of the invasion of another's
private use and enjoyment of the land and the invasion is intentional
and unreasonable. 110
The federal government can, like any private land holder, sue
based on common law theories."" The Oregon Supreme Court in Mar103. Id. comment (i).
104. 474 P.2d 739, 740 (Or. 1970).
105. Id. at 740.
106. See generally GEORGE WUENTHER, YELLOWSTONE AND THE FIRES OF CHANGE
62-63 (1988).

107. As with all parties to litigation the federal government must be careful to
avoid filing frivolous claims in violation of the rules of civil procedure. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 11.

108.
109.
110.
111.

RESTATEMENTS, supra note 77,

Id. § 821E.
Id. § 822.
Boone, 476 F.2d at 278.

§ 821D.
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tin, recognized that a nuisance action can arise when one's property is
intentionally, negligently or recklessly invaded by fire." 2 The Martin
court based its decision on trespass however, not on nuisance.
A nuisance action is intended to apply when there has been a
nontrespassory invasion of the use and enjoyment of a person's land.
The federal government might bring a nuisance action when a fire adjacent to federal land is ruining the purpose of the federal land. For
example, an adjacent landowner may burn his or her property, for
whatever reason, and the smoke from the fire destroys the public's
ability to recreate on the federal land. No cases exist where the federal government sued another for fire damages based upon a private
nuisance theory. It appears that nuisance actions would be limited to
particular facts, like smoke interference, because once the fire moves
onto another's land the invasion constitutes a trespass.
Strict Liability. Strict liability for fire, because it is an "abnormally dangerous activity," is another potential theory for the federal
government to consider. Whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous" is generally determined by considering: the degree of risk, the
likelihood of harm, the inability to avoid the risk, common usage of
the activity, location
where the activity occurs, and the value to the
3
community."1
In Koos v. Roth, the Oregon Supreme Court found a particular
fire to be "abnormally dangerous." Thus, the responsible parties were
held to be strictly liable for a trespass and for damages caused by the
trespass due to the spread of the fire."" The court stated that a fire is
only "abnormally dangerous" if set under unreasonably dangerous
conditions. In Koos, the defendant had permitted a fire to grow to 55
acres on open land which was susceptible to winds. A strong wind
spread the fire onto neighboring private land causing damage to the
property. The defendants had taken the precautions of plowing a border around the perimeter of the field before it burned and providing
mobile water tanks to douse the fire. Despite the protective measures,
the court considered the burning to be an "abnormally dangerous"
condition and imposed strict liability. ' 5
The NPS might run into difficulties with several of these determinative factors of strict liability. First, the use of fire as a range management tool is likely a common usage in the GYA. Many ranchers in
the arid western states have traditionally used fire for a variety of
purposes."' The NPS, itself, under its new plan authorizes man-made
prescribed fire to alleviate the forest of unwanted fuels."' Thus, there
112. Martin, 474 P.2d at 740.
113. RESTATEMENTS, supra note 77, §§ 519-520.
114.
115.
116.
117.

652 P.2d 1255, 1267-68 (Or. 1982).
Id. at 1267.
Varley, supra note 95, at 108.
Management Plan, supra note 16, at 50-51.
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is a good argument that fire as a range and forest management tool is
customary in the GYA. Second, the value of ranching and timbering
to communities in the GYA may be strong enough to outweigh the
dangerous attributes of fire.
The Restatements (Second) of Torts states: "In west Texas, a dry
land whose livestock must have water, such a reservoir is regarded as
a natural and common use of the land. The same conclusion has been
reached by many of the western states as to irrigation ditches."" 8 By
analogy, it could be argued that clearing ditches with fire is a natural
and common use of the land. Therefore, basing an argument solely on
a theory of "abnormally dangerous activity" and strict liability could
be a risky endeavor.
Fires started by private parties will continue to exist in the GYA.
The NPS has many viable theories to recover losses caused by these
fires. However, due to the high costs of fighting forest fires, the limited funds of many potential defendants and the difficulties of proving
causation, the federal government may often be forced, or choose, to
absorb the losses." 9 When a fire is of smaller size, however, it may be
prudent for the federal government to bring an action.
Remedies Available to Non-Federal PartiesInjured by Fires Permitted to Burn on NPS Land
Inevitably, under the new plan a prescribed fire, whether natural
or man made, will burn beyond its prescriptions and cause damage to
private entities. Because mother nature is so unpredictable, even the
best preparations cannot ensure against a fire spreading beyond its
desired bounds. Human beings cannot always control fire, no matter
how much they wish; "the raw, unbridled power of these fires cannot
be overemphasized."' 2
Using the new plan and the 1988 experience in the GYA, the next
part of this discussion will analyze how a non-federal party might seek
relief for losses due to fires ignited on or passing through federal
lands. The discussion focuses on three potential theories of relief to
these non-federal parties: first, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
which governs all tort claims brought against the federal government,"2 ' second, an action for inverse condemnation which remedies
an unconstitutional taking, and third, a potential political remedy will
be briefly examined.

118.

RESTATEMENTS,

supra note 77, § 520 comment k.

119. SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 26. The cost of fighting the 1988 North Fork Fire
amounted to approximately $25 million and was started by four individuals who were
never sued civilly by the federal government.
120. Elfring, supra note 1, at 671.
121. 28 U.S.C §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
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Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
The 1946 FTCA made the United States liable for torts to the
same extent as a private person in the same situation. 2 This waiver
of sovereign immunity however, is fraught with limitations. For example, the United States can never be held liable for prejudgment interest or for punitive damages.1 23 FTCA claims must be filed with the
appropriate agency within two years of the action or omission. 2 " More
important is the limit set by the discretionary function exception.
Under this exception, the United States retains immunity for an act
or omission by an employee which involves certain types of
discretion.""
The Discretionary Function Exception. Any discussion of the
FTCA must begin with the discretionary function exception because a
party will not have standing to bring the tort action if the responsible
government employee was performing his or her duty within the exception. In Defrees v. United States, a private land holder sued the
USFS, in the Federal District Court for Oregon, for failing to suppress
and control a fire which started on USFS land.'26 The particular fire
which caused Defrees' damage was one of twenty fires ignited during a
single two hour period due to lightning strikes from a system of dry
thunderstorms. 127 Because of the high incidence of fire and the lack of
available equipment and trained personnel, the USFS had to prioritize its suppression efforts. Because the fire which eventually burned
the Defrees' land was not an immediate threat to private property and
appeared to be burning more slowly, the USFS decided to concentrate
its efforts elsewhere. 2 8 The court held that the USFS actions addressing this situation were properly within the realm of actions intended
to be protected
by the discretionary function, and thus immunity was
29
sustained.'

The Defrees court analyzed the discretionary function issue
through a two step process. First, it asked whether the USFS had any
discretion or choice in what actions to take. The court found that
there was an element of choice because of the limited materials and
personnel. 3 ' Had the court not found an element of choice, then the
federal government would not have retained its immunity. Second,
the court asked whether the USFS's discretion involved social, economic or political policies that were intended to be protected by the
exception. The court held that the decisions, establishing priorities
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a), 2401(b) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
738 F. Supp. 380 (D. Or. 1990).
Id. at 381.

128. Id. at 381-82.
129. Id. at 385.
130. Id.
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and assigning personnel and equipment, involved these protected
policies.131
However, in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, an earlier decision,
the United States Supreme Court declared that the USFS would be
liable for negligently fighting a forest fire, if under similar circumstances, a private party would be held liable under state law.13 ' This
case was decided 11 years after the enactment of the FTCA, but fails
to mention the discretionary exception or whether it applied to USFS
employees fighting fire.
The Defrees court, in interpreting Rayonier, said that this omission could be interpreted in one of two ways: first, that the discretionary immunity does not exempt forest service employees fighting fires,
or second, that based on the particular facts of Rayonier, the exception did not apply.133 The Defrees court opted for the latter interpretation because of the distinguishable facts in the two cases. 3, In
Rayonier, the USFS had permitted a fire to smolder for forty days
until strong winds caused the fire to spread. The USFS also had 3 a5
sufficient supply of personnel and equipment to extinguish the fire.1
Based upon Defrees and Rayonier it appears that the discretionary function exception hinges on whether the federal agency has to
make choices because it lacks the necessary equipment and personnel
to extinguish a fire. Therefore, in a scenario similar to the fires of
1988, where the supplies and personnel were insufficient for the size of
the conflagration, it appears that the discretionary function exception
would apply.
In Mandel v. United States, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a different formulation of the test for the discretionary function exception.'3 8 Mandel sued the United States for injuries he sustained in Buffalo River National Park. Based upon advice given to
him from a park ranger as to the best place to swim, Mandel dived
into the river and hit a rock with his head causing permanent paralysis. 3 The court based its discretionary function decision on a distinction between planning level decisions and operational level decisions.
Planning level decisions grounded in social, economic or political policies are protected by the exception, but operational level decisions are
not. '8 An operational level decision is one where the government employee is simply involved in the day-to-day management of an established policy. 39 The court held the failure to warn Mandel of the
131. Id.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

352 U.S. 315 (1952).
Id. at 384.
Defrees, 738 F. Supp. at 384.
Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 317.
793 F.2d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 966.
Id. at 967-68.
Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1983).
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known submerged rocks and the advice as to the best swimming hole
were operational level acts and omissions and found that the United
States was not immune.14 Applying the Mandel analysis to fires in
the GYA offers a higher prospect of success.
YNP's new fire plan has essentially completed the planning
stages. Once the plan is finalized and approved, all which remains is
to implement its standards and mandates. The plan, as it stands now,
includes some very specific standards and guidelines governing the fire
management process.14' Once the NPS adopts this new plan the policy
making based upon social, economic and political factors will be over.
Thus, when an NPS employee fails to comply with the set guidelines,
he or she will be involved in the day-to-day management under the
new plan, which is at the operational level. Examples of operational
level acts would be when an NPS employee fails to suppress a fire
when the level of the environmental conditions exceed those set in the
prescription or fails to suppress a fire which starts in the suppression
zone. The NPS would then be open to an action against them under
the FTCA.
There is a blurred line between which decisions are made at the
operational level and which decisions are made at the planning level.
Where a fire is ignited naturally or by management within the proper
zones of the park and within the level of the environmental conditions
set in the prescriptions for that zone, and the fire then becomes uncontrollable, a tort suit against the United States will likely be barred.
In those circumstances, the NPS has followed the proper procedure
and guidelines set by the new plan. The NPS has done nothing negligent in the day-to-day management, instead the new plan itself could
arguably be at fault because its guidelines did not succeed. If private
property was damaged by fire under these conditions, the owner could
argue that the new plan was at fault, but the creation of the new plan
is likely a planning level decision. Therefore, the suit would be barred
by the discretionary exception to the FTCA.
A claimant should argue the unreasonableness of a particular employee's act or omission instead of asserting the unreasonableness of
the new plan's guidelines. When a fire escapes federal land in the
GYA and burns private property, the owner of that property should
investigate the management of that particular fire. The party should
ascertain if the NPS followed the precise standards set in the new
plan. For example, a party could check to see if the fire started in
either the conditional zone or the prescribed natural fire zone. A party
could also inquire into the environmental conditions on the day that
the fire started and during the time it was permitted to burn. If the
140. Mandel, 793 F.2d at 968.
141. Management Plan,supra note 16, at 52. For example, the prescribed natural
fire program provides a specific flow chart for NPS employees to follow. This flow
chart gives the exact appropriate response when a fire begins under the new plan's
jurisdiction. Id. at 53.
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burning index, energy release component, or the drought index were
above the level set in determining the prescription, then the fire
should have been suppressed at the operational level. This information is available from the NPS and the USFS through the Freedom of
Information Act.14
Beyond the Discretionary Function Exception. Proving that a
tort action against the federal government is not excused due to the
discretionary exception of the FTCA simply establishes standing. As
was evident in Defrees, this is not a simple task. Given circumstances
like Defrees or similar to the 1988 fires, a court is unlikely to find
negligence by the fire fighting agency due to the extreme weather conditions and number of local fires. The court will likely be sympathetic
with a federal agency's dilemma of priorities and limited resources. 141
However, where the guidelines are clearly established, as with the new
plan, a court may be less sympathetic if the agency failed to properly
consider the weather conditions and available personnel and
equipment.
Once in court, a plaintiff must then prove all the elements of the
underlying cause of action. The law of the place where the act or
omission occurred governs the federal government's liability. 44 Thus,
in the GYA a claimant would rely upon the statutory or common law
of Wyoming, Montana, or Idaho.
An FTCA action against the United States must seek damages for
injury or loss of property.'4" In Oregon v. United States, Oregon was,
trying to recover the cost of suppressing a fire that was set by the
USFS and then burned out of control and onto state property. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state action could not be
maintained under the FTCA because the action did not contain a
claim for damage due to injury or loss of property. Instead, the state
was trying to recover the cost of suppressing the fire based upon an
Oregon statute which provides for recovery of suppression costs. 4 '
Therefore, a cause of action under the FTCA must be for damages
due to injury from a fire, not for suppression costs.
All common law defenses available to a private party are also
available to the federal government when sued under the FTCA. For
example, in Mandel that court applied the theory of comparative negligence.147 In Wenzel v. United States, 4 8 a private party sued the
USFS for damages which occurred when the USFS entered the plain142. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
143. Defrees, 738 F. Supp. at 385.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988); Mandel, 793 F.2d at 968.
145. Oregon v. United States, 308 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 372
U.S. 941 (1963).
146. Id. at 569.
147. Mandel, 793 F.2d at 968-69. The court apportioned fault based upon an Arkansas statute because that is where the Buffalo River National Park is located.
148. 225 F. Supp. 726 (D. Idaho 1964).
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tiff's land to fight a forest fire. In applying the common law doctrine
of necessity, the court relieved the USFS of liability for the trespass
because the fire had to be fought to avoid its spread. " "
Negligence has been established and liability imposed on the
United States for forest fire damage. In Maloof v. United States,'50
the federal government was found negligent for starting a fire through
an independent contractor during hazardous weather conditions. The
contractor had ignited a fire during a period of low humidity, high
winds,
and without equipment available to prevent the spread of the
15
fire. 1
The weather conditions during the 1988 fire were even more severe than the conditions that existed in Maloof. In 1988, the region
was in the midst of an unprecedented drought and the dangers of dry
thunderstorms were prevalent.'5 2 The entire GYA is normally dry and
windy during the critical summer months. It receives most of its annual moisture in the form of snow during the colder months.153 It
therefore seems unreasonable for a prudent person to ever permit a
fire to burn during the summer months in the GYA if the Maloof
analysis is used. However, the fact that Maloof occurred in a densely
populated eastern state and because the fire in Maloof was ignited by
an independent contractor employed by the federal government, these
two situations are distinguishable. YNP is located in a sparsely populated area far removed from any major urban population. Therefore, a
court would be more likely to find a prescribed fire system reasonable
in the GYA. However, if a fire is permitted to burn after the new plan
is implemented, under environmental conditions similar to those existing in Maloof, then it is likely that the new plan would be violated.
The environmental criteria established in the new plan would likely
mandate suppression.
Damages: Lost Profits to Local Businesses. Until this point the
discussion has focused on the recovery of general property damages.
Following the 1988 fire there has been concern over potential damage
done to the tourist economy in the GYA."' Therefore, the potential
for recovery of lost tourism dollars will be examined.
In specific circumstances courts have recognized the potential for
recovery of lost profits due to the negligent act of another. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Union Oil Company v. Oppen, held that a
group of fishermen could recover lost profits due to an oil spill if they
149. Id.

150. 242 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Md. 1965).
151. Id. at 179.
152. SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 20.
153. Schullery, supra note 7, at 688.

154. Fires May Have Jeopardized Yellowstone Tourism in the Longrun, LARAMIE

DAmy BOOMERANG, March 8, 1989, at 10. In a survey commissioned by the Wyoming
and Montana Travel Commissions, it was suggested that, because of the belief by most
that the Park had been destroyed a number of people would never come to visit. Id.
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could prove the losses.155 The oil spill covered much of the area that
the fishermen used for commercial fishing purposes and the fishermen
wanted recovery for the alleged reduction in the commercial fishing
potential. The Ninth Circuit's analysis focused on two theories. First,
the court reasoned that the defendants should have reasonably foreseen that this injury to the fishing industry would result from a negligent oil spill of this magnitude. The killing of fish is widely understood as a natural result of an oil spill, reasoned the court. Second, the
court found the oil company to be the "best cost-avoider" under an
economic theory. 5 6 That is, the oil company was in the best position
to have avoided the accident with proper measures. The holding limited recovery to the commercial fishermen only and conditioned recovery on the plaintiff's
ability to provide proof of the losses with reason157
able certainty.

Those businesses which suffered lost profits from the 1988 fire in
the GYA might make a similar argument as the one recognized in
Union Oil. It seems to be reasonably foreseeable that a large fire in
the GYA will keep some tourists from traveling to the area. As a direct result, the businesses which depend heavily on the traffic coming
into the area will suffer losses. The federal government also seems to
be the "best cost-avoider" because it has the personnel, training and
equipment to avoid a large fire. However, these businesses will have
difficulty in proving the lost profits with any certainty because the
losses due to decreased visits to YNP may have been recouped during
the fire by sales to the fire fighting crews dispatched to the area. 5 8
Inverse Condemnation
Where the United States physically enters private land and ousts
the owner, the owner then has the right to bring an action in inverse
condemnation to recover the value of the land on the date of the intrusion by the government.5 9 The ultimate test in an inverse condemnation suit is whether the government action deprives the owner of all
or most of his or her interest in the property. 6 ' The claimant must
show that the government's direct act caused the invasion of the private property but a party does not have to prove that the government
155. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
156. Id. at 569. The "best cost-avoider" analysis was created by Professor Calabresi as a means of apportioning loss. The "best cost-avoider" is the party who could
have most easily prevented the accident. Id.
157. Union Oil Co., 501 F.2d at 570.
158. Western Wyoming Boomed as Yellowstone Burned, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE,
February 19, 1989, at A-3. The four western Wyoming counties closest to YNP realized
an overall increase in sales taxes of 7.9% during the summer of 1988.
159. Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984); U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Inverse condemnation is an action in which a property owner sues to
recover just compensation for a taking of his or her property when a government has
not used the condemnation process.
160. Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 950 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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intended to invade or take. 16 1 Therefore, the necessary elements for an
inverse condemnation action are: (1) physical entry upon private land
by the government, (2) a deprivation of all or most of the uses of the
land, and (3) an action by the government which causes the invasion.
However, the question of whether there has been a constitutional taking is analyzed in a case by case approach.' 62
An inverse condemnation action can also arise when the government acts and the action works a temporary taking. In First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles City, the United States
Supreme Court held that when a zoning regulation works a temporary
taking of all the use of private property, a cause of action for inverse
condemnation may arise.16 In this case, a California zoning regulation
made it illegal for a church to rebuild certain structures which had
been destroyed in a flood. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for a determination
of whether all uses had been taken. The state court ruled against the
164
church because the regulation did not affect all the possible uses.
The United States Supreme Court's ruling before remand indicates
that a temporary taking may be actionable if it deprives the owner of
all uses for the property.
The Just Compensation Clause of the United States Constitution
requires the government to pay the landowner the value of the use of
his or her land during the period of the temporary taking. 63 Value is
measured by the landowner's loss at the time of the taking, not the
value of the benefit to the government.' 6 The taking occurs when the
government actually intrudes.1 67 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, had a taking been found, the compensation would
have been measured from the time the zoning ordinance went into
effect until it was repealed.
During the summer of 1988, the communities of Silver Gate and
Cooke City, Montana were repeatedly threatened by the Storm Creek
Fire. 68 On September 4-5, 1988, these two communities were evacuated by the federal government due to the proximity of the Storm
Creek Fire. The Storm Creek fire began in a "wilderness" area and
was not subject to immediate suppression because the existing management policy permitted naturally ignited fires to burn in that re-

161. Sheldon v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 247,251-52 n.6 (1990).
162. Agins v Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
163. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
164. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1374 (1989).
165. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 319.
166. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
167. Kirby Forest Industries, Inc., 467 U.S. at 5.
168. SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 28. The Storm Creek fire was ignited by lightning
on June 14, 1988 in the Absoroka-Beartooth Wilderness area north of YNP's northeast
entrance. The fire burned in a total area of 95,000 acres before it was extinguished by
the fall snows. Id. at 21.
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mote area." 9
In this very specific factual circumstance, where the USFS or the
NPS affirmatively decides to permit a natural fire to burn which later
becomes uncontrollable and thus forces evacuation of or damages private homes and businesses, an inverse condemnation action might be
a means to seek redress. The government's failure to take action
forced a physical invasion and temporary taking of private land and
all its uses. If successful under this theory, a claimant could recover
for the loss of use of the property during the temporary taking. Had
the property been damaged, the temporary taking may have been
longer than the evacuation period. If the property had a business on
it, then the owner or operator might recover business losses during the
taking's duration. However, this compensation would only compensate
for lost business over the period in which the occupant was denied his
or her use.
Special Remedies Made Available for the 1988 Fires.
In 1990, the United States Congress directed the USFS to settle
all the damage claims for private property injured by the 1988 GYA
fires. Funds were provided in an emergency appropriations act passed
on May 25, 1990.1"0 The relevant section directs the USFS to negotiate and reach a compromise on claims resulting from 1988 fires which
began as prescribed fires and later became wildfires. The act gave the
claimant ninety days to file a claim and permitted claims already settled under the FTCA to be reconsidered.1 7 ' Evidently, Congress felt
compelled to make this money available because the USFS was not
willing to admit negligence for these prescribed fires in 1988.172 This
act did not provide funds for damages caused by the 1988 North Fork
fire because the North Fork fire did not start as a prescribed fire. The
Storm Creek Fire, which threatened the towns of Cooke City and Silver Gate did begin as a prescribed fire and is covered by the 1990 act.
This act did not guarantee compensation for any alleged damage, it
only directs the USFS to negotiate and provide the funding. Approximately 106 claims totalling 7.2 million dollars were filed as of July
1990.'7
Methods of recovery from the federal government for private parties injured by future fires beginning in YNP are very limited. The
federal government can escape liability through the discretionary ex169. Final Recommendations, supra note 26, at 25,663.
170. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, Food
Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, and Other Urgent Needs, and
Transfers, and Reducing Funds Budgeted for Military Spending Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-302, 104 Stat. 213, 230-231 (1990) [hereinafter Disaster Act 1990].
171. Id.
172. Yellowstone Fire Claims Now Total $11 Million, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, July
24, 1990, at B1.
173. Id.
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ception, by proving the existence of an intervening cause or by the
two year FTCA statute of limitations. Perhaps the injured property
owners could use the political process by petitioning Congress to pass
legislation as they did in 1990. The national media attention and the
severity of the 1988 fires however, likely contributed to Congress's decision to settle claims. Other Congressmen viewed the supposed devastation of YNP through the media and might have seen this appropriation as politically necessary because their constituents also saw
the media reports. Seeking redress through the Takings Clause is reserved for specific situations. The inverse condemnation argument
discussed above is untested and unique, but it might be a method for
compensation due to forest fire damage. The NPS seems to be substantially shielded from liability during normal fire years if it follows
the mandates of the new plan because of the discretionary exception
under the FTCA and the limitations of an inverse condemnation
action.
CONCLUSION

The new plan for YNP appears sound in principle and in law.
The new plan successfully incorporates the benefits of fire in promoting ecological diversity and protects against harm to YNP buildings,
visitors and YNP's neighbors. A reoccurrence of the 1988 fire season is
unlikely in the near future. Based upon scientific data, a conflagration
of that intensity is believed to repeat itself only every 200-300
years.17 The new plan sets more stringent standards for the allowance
of prescribed fire. Therefore, YNP and the GYA will not likely face
the massive damages of 1988 during the lifetime of this new management plan.
It is likely that the federal taxpayer will continue to foot most of
the cost of forest fires in the GYA. The NPS can avail themselves of a
number of theories for recovery when a fire is the fault of another.
However, state actions using these theories vary from state to state.
The amount of recovery, in both state and federal actions, is limited
by most statutes and by the defendant's ability to pay. If 1988 is any
indication of how the federal government will deal with these actions
then we will see very few civil suits against individuals who cause fires
in YNP. This may be an acceptable burden on the taxpayer if the
NPS is as successful in its campaign promoting the benefits of natural
fire as it was in promoting
the suppression of all forest fires with
17
"Smokey the Bear. 1
The potential for suits against the United States for forest fire
damage to private property has increased since the days of immediate
174. Despain, supra note 14, at 698-99.
175. Management Plan, supra note 16, at 40. The USDI proposes to inundate the
public with information about the new plan. The NPS proposes to use pamphlets,
posters and interpretive talks to explain the role of fire in the GYE. Id.
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suppression. The new plan and the geographical location of YNP,
however greatly decrease the risk of liability. When there is a clear
violation of the new plan's standards by a NPS employee, a successful
FTCA claim may follow. If the NPS employees follow the operational
level mandates of the new plan, then it is unlikely that a court will
find the NPS negligent for fire damage to private property or business
losses.' Additionally, most of the lands surrounding YNP are federally owned, and therefore, the number of potential claimants is significantly reduced.
It is important for people to be aware of inverse condemnation as
a potential remedy when the government encroaches on private property. This remedy is available only in specific circumstances and may
be limited to actions where fire causes a deprivation of all the uses of
the property. Inverse condemnation is a cause of action that may be
arguable in a wide variety of fact situations, from the actual physical
removal of the owner from private property to the effect of zoning
ordinances on private property. Inverse condemnation often fails however, because the plaintiff fails to prove a taking of all or most uses.
The USDI and USDA have been very careful and thorough in
their creation of this new plan. The USDI and USDA enlisted the
assistance of a group of experts to investigate the 1988 fires and the
old plan. They then utilized the team's advice to draft a new plan and
an environmental assessment. A repeat of fires in the GYA that occurred in 1988 is not likely in the near future due to the careful new
plan and the cyclical nature of forest fires, but the potential for small
damaging fires still exists. Therefore, the federal government and private parties must be prepared to possibly compensate others for losses
due to forest fires.
PETER H. FROELICHER

176. SAX, supra note 37, at 81. Sax suggests that land owners in the GYA will
increasingly see the scope of their private property right shrunk by the modem view of
YNP as an entire ecosystem. He analogizes this with the limits placed on private property rights by zoning legislation in large urban areas. Id.
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